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 ABSTRACT 
The Determinants of Merger Waves*
by Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller and B. Burçin Yurtoglu 
One of the most conspicuous features of mergers is that they come in waves, 
and that these waves are correlated with increases in share prices and 
price/earnings ratios.  We test four hypotheses that have been advanced to 
explain merger waves: the industry shocks, q-, overvaluation and managerial 
discretion hypotheses.  The first two are neoclassical in that they assume that 
managers maximize profits, mergers create wealth, and the capital market is 
efficient.  The last two, behavioral hypotheses relax these assumptions in 
different ways.  We test the four hypotheses by estimating models of the 
amounts of assets acquired by firms, models that identify the characteristics of 
targets, and estimates of the returns to acquirers’ shareholders.  Although some 
support is found for each of the four hypotheses, most of the evidence favors 
the two behavioral hypotheses. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Determinanten von Fusionswellen 
Es ist eines der auffallendsten Merkmale von Unternehmenszusammen-
schlüssen, dass sie in Wellen stattfinden und dass diese Wellen mit dem 
Anstieg der Aktienkurse und des Preis/ Ertragsverhältnisses zusammen 
hängen. Wir untersuchen vier Hypothesen, die als Erklärung von 
Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen genannt werden: die der Industrieschocks, 
die q-Hypothese, die Hypothese der Überbewertung und die Hypothesen des 
Ermessensspielraums von Managern. Die ersten zwei sind neoklassischer 
Natur insofern als sie davon ausgehen, dass Manager Gewinne maximieren, 
Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse Reichtum schaffen und der Kapitalmarkt 
effizient ist. Die zwei letzteren sind Verhaltenshypothesen, die die neo-
klassischen Annahmen (auf unterschiedliche Weise) lockern. Wir untersuchen 
die vier Hypothesen, indem wir Modellschätzungen der von Unternehmen 
akquirierten Aktien vornehmen. Dabei werden in den Modellen die 
Charakteristika der bei Zusammenschlüssen aufgekauften Unternehmen  
identifiziert und die Rendite für die Aktionäre des aufkaufenden Unternehmens  
geschätzt. Auch wenn alle vier Hypothesen in gewisser Hinsicht Bestätigung 
finden, untermauern die meisten Belege die zwei Verhaltenshypothesen. 
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One of the most striking characteristics of mergers is that they come in bunches.  This 
characteristic is readily apparent in Figure 1, where the number of mergers is plotted 
beginning in the 1880s.1  The second curve in Figure 1 is the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
price/earnings ratio (P/E). A close association between aggregate merger activity and the 
S&P P/E is apparent, and it can be regarded as the second major regularity in aggregate 
merger data.2  Any hypothesis that claims to explain merger waves must account for this 
relationship. 
An enormous number of hypotheses have been advanced to explain why mergers take 
place.3  These fall broadly into two categories: (1) neoclassical theories that assume that 
managers maximize profits or shareholder wealth and thus that mergers increase either 
market power or efficiency, or (2) non-neoclassical or behavioral theories that posit some 
other motivation for mergers and/or other consequences. 
 Most of the hypotheses have been advanced to explain specific kinds of mergers.  
Vertical mergers have been explained, for example, as attempts both to increase market 
power by increasing barriers to entry (Comanor, 1967), and to increase efficiency by 
reducing transaction costs (Williamson, 1975).  We find many of these hypotheses to be 
plausible explanations for some mergers, but they do not offer convincing explanations for 
waves in aggregate merger activity.  For example, a vertical merger between two firms 
possessing assets dedicated to transacting with each other can reduce transaction costs, but it 
is difficult to imagine why the conditions necessary to make such mergers profitable would 
appear across a sufficient number of industries at a particular point in time to generate a wave 
in aggregate merger activity, and why this point in time should correspond to a stock market 
rally. 
 We assume that mergers such as these are taking place all of the time.  For a merger 
wave to occur some sorts of mergers must greatly increase in frequency at particular points in 
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time.  Our task is then to determine which hypotheses are likely to predict such variations in 
the frequency of mergers over time. 
 In this article we examine four hypotheses that have been put forward specifically as 
explanations of merger waves – the industry shocks hypothesis, the q-theory, and the 
overvaluation and managerial discretion hypotheses.  The first two are neoclassical in that 
they assume (1) that managers maximize shareholders’ wealth, (2) mergers are wealth 
creating, and (3) capital market efficiency.  The other two may be classified as behavioral, 
because they drop the assumption of capital market efficiency and/or that managers 
maximize their shareholders’ wealth. 
 Although the assumptions underlying the four hypotheses differ in these basic ways, 
there is some overlap in their predictions making it difficult to discriminate among them by 
comparing the results from each theory’s implied model of the determinants of mergers.  The 
theories differ in part, however, not only with respect to their predictions about the 
determinants of mergers, but also with respect to their predictions about (1) the determinants 
of tender offers versus friendly mergers, (2) the characteristics of target firms, and (3) the 
post-merger share performance of acquiring firms.  To help discriminate among the four 
hypotheses, each of these additional sets of predictions is also examined. 
 The next four sections present the underlying logic of each hypothesis followed by a 
critique.  These logical critiques are an important part of our effort to discriminate among the 
theories.  The empirical evidence must carry less of a burden, if the underlying logic of a 
hypothesis is weak or inconsistent with other facts about mergers.  Each critique is followed 
by a discussion of the existing evidence in support of the theory and our test of it.  In Section 
V we discuss our data, while Sections VI-IX contain the results of the tests.  Some 
conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
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I. The Industry Shocks Hypothesis   
A. Underlying Logic  
Several studies have presented evidence of significant variations in merger activity across 
industries (Mitchell and Mullerin, 1996; Mullerin and Boone, 2000; Andrade, Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2001; and Harford, 2004).  To go from waves within individual industries to a wave 
across the entire economy, several industries must enter a wave at the same time.  Only 
Harford has claimed that this happens, and thus we focus on his arguments and evidence. 
Harford puts forth his “neoclassical explanation of merger waves” as an alternative to one 
of the behavioral hypotheses discussed below.  He argues that 
…merger waves occur in response to specific industry shocks that require large scale 
reallocation of assets.  However, these shocks are not enough.  There must be sufficient 
capital liquidity to accommodate the asset reallocation.  The increase in capital liquidity 
and reduction in financing constraints that is correlated with high asset values must be 
present for the shock to propagate a wave….Thus, the explanation for merger waves is 
intuitive: they require both an economic motivation for transactions and relatively low 
transaction costs to generate the large volume of transactions.  (Harford, 2004) 
B. Critique  
 There are two ways to interpret the industry shocks hypothesis (hereafter ISH).  (1) 
All industries are buffeted by shocks from time to time and once and awhile several 
industries receive shocks at the same time.  When this event is accompanied by a macro-level 
expansion in liquidity, all of the industries receiving shocks enter into a merger wave 
producing a wave in the aggregate.  It strikes us unlikely that these two events would occur 
simultaneously.  Moreover, recalling the two curves in figure 1, it must be the case that there 
has been a clustering of industry shocks at the beginning of every stock market boom.  This 
strikes us as a remarkable set of coincidences. 
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 (2) Industries are buffeted by shocks all of the time and at any particular point in time 
several industries have recently received shocks.  When there is a macro-level expansion in 
liquidity, all of the industries recently receiving shocks enter into a merger wave producing a 
wave in the aggregate.  Here we merely note that under this interpretation of the ISH the 
shocks hitting industries do not explain the merger wave, but only which industries enter into 
it.  The wave itself is explained entirely by macroeconomic liquidity factors.   
 The argument that mergers are constrained by macroeconomic liquidity conditions is, 
however, problematic, given the neoclassical assumptions underlying the industry shocks 
hypothesis – managers maximize shareholder wealth, mergers are wealth enhancing, the 
capital market is efficient.  To see the difficulty, consider two firms A and B.  A has 100 
shares outstanding with a price PA = 1, and thus a market value of MA = 100.  B has 50 shares 
outstanding with a price PB = 1, and a market value of MB = 50.  A merger between the two 
firms will produce a company C with a market value of 180.  Firm A announces that it plans 
to acquire B by issuing I shares of its own stock for all 50 of B’s.  The efficient capital market 
assumption implies that the share price of the new firm C immediately rises upon the 
merger’s announcement to reflect the new firm’s true value, 180 = PC(100+I).  The gain from 
the merger to the shareholders of A is PC100 – 100, and the gain to the shareholders of B is  
PC I – 50.  The assumption that the managers of A and B maximize their shareholders’ wealth 
implies that an I is agreed upon such that both gains are positive.  The transaction costs of 
making such share exchanges should be independent of macroeconomic liquidity conditions.  
So long as A and B have shares outstanding, such exchanges will be mutually beneficial. 
 Acquiring firms are generally much larger than the companies they acquire, and very 
few mergers of any importance are undertaken by firms that do not have stock outstanding.  
The targets of acquisitions may, however, be small firms or divisions of firms that do not 
have shares outstanding.  This does not change the logic of the above argument, however.  A 
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announces that it intends to acquire B or a division of B, and that it will sell I of its own 
shares to finance the purchase.  The efficient capital market factors in both the sale of the 
shares and the acquisition of the assets and sets a new price for A’s shares that allows it to 
undertake the transaction paying for the assets with the cash raised from the sale of its shares.  
 Here it should be noted that the fact that share prices and Tobin’s qs are high during a 
stock market boom cannot be used to argue that financing mergers through share swaps is 
relatively cheap during stock market booms.  Under the efficient capital market assumption 
underlying the ISH, shares are always accurately (unbiasedly) priced.  A firm with a q of two 
is perceived by the market to have significantly better prospects than a firm with a q of one.  
It costs the first firm’s shareholders just as much in forgone wealth to issue $100 of its shares 
as it does for the second.  The notion that equity capital is a relatively cheap source of finance 
when P/E ratios or qs are above their long-run averages implicitly denies the efficiency of the 
capital market and feeds into the overvaluation and managerial discretion hypotheses.  
C. Testing the ISH 
1. Determinants of mergers 
 In Harford’s tests of the ISH several measures of industry shocks plus a measure of 
macroeconomic credit conditions prove to be significant.  Our tests of the four hypotheses 
employ firm-level data, and so we test the ISH in a different way.  It is obvious from figure 1 
that there is considerable time series variation in merger activity.  The ISH claims that this is 
explained by time series variation in industry merger activity.  Thus, knowing what industry a 
firm is in should contribute to the explanatory power of the equation.  We assign each firm to 
one of the 48 industries used by Harford and create 48 industry dummies4.  We then first 
determine how much variation in merger activity two-year time dummies alone can explain.  
We choose two-year intervals on the grounds that a surge in merger activity must be of at 
least two years duration to constitute a wave (Harford also identifies waves in two-year 
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intervals).  We then see how much additional explanatory power is obtained when the pure 
time dummies are replaced by time/industry-dummy interactions.  This way of testing the 
ISH obviates the need to identify the shocks that led to merger waves in particular industries.  
Regardless of the cause of the industry wave, under the ISH knowledge of the industry a firm 
is in at a particular point in time should add explanatory power to simply knowing what the 
point in time is.  This reasoning leads to the following test of the ISH as it pertains to the 
determinants of mergers. 
ISH-DM.  A set of industry-time dummies adds considerable explanatory power to an 
equation explaining merger activity over simply a set of time dummies. 
 The ISH also stresses the importance of macroeconomic liquidity constraints, which 
Harford measures by the spread between the commercial and industrial loan rate and the 
federal funds rate (hereafter C&I).  Although, as discussed above, the logic of this argument 
is problematic for the overwhelming majority of firms making acquisitions, we test whether 
C&I contributes to the explanatory power of the model.   
2. Tender offers versus friendly mergers 
 An important distinction in the two behavioral hypotheses is between tender offers 
and friendly mergers.  A friendly merger is defined as one for which the terms of the 
transaction are agreed to by the managers of the two firms.  In a tender offer, the acquirer’s 
managers set the terms through a bid for the target’s shares at a particular price.  Under the 
ISH all mergers are expected to be profitable, thus both tender offers and friendly mergers 
should be profitable.  Once a firm’s managers decide to acquire another firm, they have a 
choice between a friendly merger and a takeover.  If the price that the target’s managers are 
willing to sell for is less than what the acquirers’ managers think they would have to bid in a 
tender offer, they will choose the friendly merger.  If the target’s managers demand a price 
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greater than what the acquirers’ managers expect to have to bid in a tender offer, they will 
favor the tender offer.  The choice between the two should depend entirely on their relative 
transaction costs.  This leads to the following tests under the ISH 
ISH-TO.  The variables used to explain acquisitions should have the same coefficients for 
tender offers and friendly mergers.  
3. Characteristics of target firms 
 It seems to us that the kinds of shocks posited by the proponents of the ISH – 
technological innovations, deregulation – would be more likely to lead to horizontal than to 
conglomerate mergers, but its proponents have not limited their tests to horizontal mergers, 
and thus we test it for all forms of mergers. 
4. Share performance of acquiring firms 
 The assumption of capital market efficiency implies that all wealth gains from a 
merger are registered in share price movements at its announcement.  Over longer time spans 
following a merger its share performance should be indistinguishable from non-merging 
firms.  The assumptions that managers maximize their shareholders’ wealth, and that mergers 
are wealth creating imply that acquiring firms’ shares exhibit positive abnormal returns at 
acquisition announcements.  Following the reasoning underlying ISH-TO, this prediction 
should hold for both tender offers and friendly mergers. 
ISH-SP1.  Acquirers in both friendly mergers and tender offers make significant positive 
abnormal returns on their shares at the acquisition announcements, and normal returns over 
longer post-merger windows. 
 Some industries experience merger waves when there is no wave in aggregate 
activity.  Presumably these too are caused by industry shocks, and thus the ISH must predict 
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that mergers during both waves in aggregate merger activity and outside of these waves meet 
the neoclassical assumptions underlying the hypothesis. 
ISH-SP2.  The share performance of acquirers is consistent with ISH-SP1 for mergers taking 
place during both wave and non-wave years. 
 
II. The q-Theory of Mergers 
A. Underlying Logic 
 Under the q-theory of investment, when a firm’s return on its capital stock exceeds its 
cost of capital, q > 1, and it expands its capital stock.  A straightforward application of the 
theory to mergers would imply that firms with qs > 1 can profitably expand by acquiring 
assets either in the form of capital investment or mergers.5  Since q measures returns on a 
firm’s existing assets, it would seem that a direct application of the q-theory to mergers 
would only allow one to explain horizontal mergers, i.e., additions to existing capital stock.  
Since less than half of all mergers are horizontal, this implication of the q-theory leaves over 
half of all mergers unaccounted for.6
An alternative interpretation of the q-theory would be that a q > 1 does not necessarily 
imply that a firm can profitably expand by acquiring more assets in its base industry, but that 
the firm is well managed and could profitably expand in any direction.7  Tobin’s q under this 
interpretation is not a measure of the quality of a firm’s assets, but of its management. 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) (hereafter J&R) are the only ones to have applied the 
q-theory to mergers and to claim that it accounts for merger waves.  They liken mergers to 
the purchase of used plant and equipment, and argue that the gap between the qs of potential 
acquiring firms and targets increases at particular points – as during a stock market boom – 
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and this widening difference leads managers to favor purchasing other firms over used capital 
equipment thus creating a merger wave. 
B. Critique 
When a firm expands it has three options: purchase new plant and equipment,    
purchase used plant and equipment, or acquire another company.  J&R assume that a firm 
limits its options to the latter two.  But this is unlikely to be optimal.  As share prices rise 
during a stock market rally, the cost of acquiring capital by buying other firms rises relative 
to that for new and used capital.  Table 1 reports the mean qs for acquirers and targets in 
tender offers and friendly mergers over our sample period.8  The mean qs for targets of 
friendly mergers exceed 1.0 in all but two years and rise to as high as 1.5 during the 1995-
2000 merger wave.  Since the q for new or used plant and equipment equals 1.0 by definition, 
these forms of asset acquisitions must dominate mergers, and mergers must become 
relatively less attractive during a merger wave when stock prices are rising.  This point is 
reinforced when one takes into account that acquiring firms must pay an additional premium 
over the market price of a company to acquire it.  Thus, if one replaces a target’s q prior to an 
acquisition (we use the end of the previous year to measure this q), with the value actually 
paid for the target (deal value), the implied cost of asset acquisitions through mergers rises 
considerably.  In several years acquirers paid on average more than double the values of the 
targets’ assets.  A similar but smaller increase is apparent for the targets of tender offers.9  
The argument that merger waves occur during stock market booms, because buying other 
companies becomes relatively cheaper than purchasing assets in new or used capital markets 
is difficult to sustain in face of the evidence in table 1. 
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C. Testing the QH 
 J&R test their q-theory of mergers by regressing the assets acquired in year t by firm i 
on (qit-1 - qTt-1), where qit-1 is Tobin’s q for firm i in period t-1, and qTt-1 is the mean Tobin’s q 
for all target firms (i.e., the companies actually acquired) in period t-1.  Defining the total 
amount of assets acquired through mergers in year t as Mit, we obtain  
QH-DM1. Mt is positively related to (qit-1 - qTt-1).  
 A further implication of QH-DM1 is   
QH-DM2.  When qit-1 and qTt-1 are entered separately in the Mit equation, qit-1 has a positive 
coefficient and qTt-1 a negative coefficient equal in absolute size to that of qit-1. 
 Since the QH shares the neoclassical assumptions of the ISH, it makes the same 
predictions with respect to tender offers versus friendly mergers, and share performance, and 
these hypotheses are not repeated here.  Its prediction with respect to the characteristics of the 
targets is subsumed in QH-DM2. 
 
III. The Overvalued Shares Hypothesis  
A. Underlying Logic 
In their theory, Shleifer and Vishny (2001) (hereafter S&V) retain the assumption that 
managers maximize shareholders’ wealth (at least as far as the acquiring firms are 
concerned), but relax the assumptions that mergers create wealth and of capital market 
efficiency.  Some firms’ share prices become overvalued during stock market booms.  Their 
managers know their shares are overvalued, and wish to protect their shareholders from the 
wealth loss that will come when the market lowers its estimates to their warranted levels.  
They accomplish this by exchanging their overvalued shares for the real assets of another 
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company, which the market presumably correctly prices.  Targets’ managers are assumed to 
have short time horizons, so they too gain by “cashing in” their stakes in their firms at 
favorable terms.  Although mergers are not assumed to possess any wealth-creating 
synergies, under the overvaluation hypothesis (hereafter OVH) they appear to be win-win 
events, since both the acquiring firm’s shareholders and the target’s managers benefit from 
the mergers.10  
B. Critique 
S&V’s OVH suffers from a similar difficulty to that of J&R’s q-theory.  Managers of 
acquiring firms are assumed to protect their shareholders from forthcoming wealth losses 
following the market’s reevaluation of their shares.  Such protection can be afforded by 
exchanging the overvalued shares for any assets that are correctly priced by the market.  
Since all share prices tend to rise during stock market booms, any firm that they buy is also 
likely to be overvalued, although not perhaps to the extent that they are.  When one adds in 
the merger premia, buying companies during stock market booms must be rather expensive 
relative to other assets (see again figures in Table 1).  An obvious alternative would be to 
issue shares to buy back one’s own debt.  The debt of other firms is another possibility, as is 
real estate, works of art, and any other real assets whose prices are not inflated during a stock 
market boom, and do not require premia of 20-30 percent or more to close the deal. 
C. Testing the OVH 
1. Determinants of mergers 
To test the OVH we need to measure the overvaluation for each firm.  Here, we 
encounter a methodological difficulty.  If we can identify firms that are overvalued, so too 
presumably can the capital market and the firms cease to be overvalued.  This conundrum 
notwithstanding, several studies have found support for the OVH using various measures of 
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overvaluation (Verter, 2002; Ang and Cheng, 2003; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh, 
2003; and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan, 2003, hereafter RKRV).  These 
measures typically involve the ratio of market to book value of equity or its reciprocal.  
These ratios tend to be highly correlated with Tobin’s q, the ratio of a firm’s market value to 
the replacement value of its assets.  Thus, there is some difficulty discriminating between the 
QH and OVH, since the key variables in each are highly correlated.  The logical 
underpinnings of each hypothesis as well as the additional tests also must be examined. 
We measure overvaluation in a way that is similar to what others have done, but is 
easier to conceptualize and interpret.  The market value of a firm i can be written as the 
present value of its profit stream from now to infinity, where πit is i’s profits in period t, and 
ki is its cost of capital. 
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if ki > gi. We assume that all firms in an industry have the same costs of capital and expected 
growth rates, and estimate 1/( ki - gi) for a typical firm by regressing the market values of all 
firms in the industry on their profits for a period of time when, based on the aggregate 
price/earnings ratio for the S&P index, shares in aggregate do not appear to be overpriced.  
Call this estimate of 1/( ki - gi), α11.  Using this α we predict firm i’s market value in year t as 
 µ µit itV απ=  (3) 
We then create a measure of a firm’s overvaluation in any year, Oit , as 
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 µit it itO V V= −  (4) 
With this measure of overvaluation we test 
OVH-DM1.  The assets acquired through mergers are positively related to Oit. 
 If managers perceive their firm to be overvalued by, say 30%, they have the same 
incentive to exchange these shares for correctly valued real or financial assets regardless of 
whether the stock market is at a normal level, depressed, or in a boom.  The logic of the OVH 
implies that the same relationship between firm overvaluation and merger activity should 
hold at all points in time.  What drives merger waves during stock market booms is that many 
more firms become overvalued.  This further implication of the theory can be tested by 
decomposing Oit into two components, Ot, the mean level of overvaluation across the entire 
sample, and dOit, the deviation of firm i’s overvaluation from this sample mean, dOit = Oit - 
Ot.  If one replaces Oit in the equation explaining merger activity with dOit and Ot, both 
variables should have the same coefficient, if all that matters for mergers is the extent of 
overvaluation of the acquiring firms.  
OVH-DM2.  The assets acquired through mergers are positively related to dOit and Ot, and 
both variables have identical coefficients. 
2. Tender offers versus friendly mergers 
 Under the OVH, the targets’ managers are willing partners in the mergers.  Managers 
of targets in hostile takeovers are virtually never willing partners in the transactions.  
Although all tender offers are not hostile takeovers, they appear to be a less friendly way to 
acquire another company than through a mutual agreement among the two companies’ 
managers.12  Thus, the OVH seems more plausible for friendly mergers than tender offers. 
OVH-TO.  The OVH is better supported for friendly mergers than for tender offers. 
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3. Characteristics of targets  
 Under the OVH, managers of targets wish to cash in their stakes in their companies.  
The incentive to cash in should be greater, the larger a stake is.  This implication of the OVH 
is tested by constructing VS, the market value of the equity held by the insiders.13  It also 
seems reasonable that the managers are more eager to sell out, the more overvalued their 
shares are.  
OVH-TC.  The probability that firm i is acquired in t is a positive function of VSit and Oit. 
4. Share performance of acquiring firms 
At some point in time the capital market corrects its error, and the share price of an 
overvalued acquirer falls to its warranted level.  The target’s managers will not accept the 
acquirer’s shares, however, if their price falls immediately upon the merger’s announcement, 
because this would not allow them to “cash in.”  We thus have 
OVH-SP1.  The shares of acquiring firms earn large negative abnormal returns over long 
time spans following the mergers, but not immediately when they are announced. 
The OVH assumes that the number of firms with overvalued shares increases during 
stock market booms and that this explains merger waves.  Thus, it implies. 
OVH-SP2.  The post-merger performance of acquirers’ shares is worse for mergers 
undertaken during merger waves. 
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IV. The Managerial-Discretion Hypothesis 
A. The Underlying Logic 
Robin Marris (1964, 1998) was the first to posit growth as an objective for managers, 
and Mueller (1969) applied the theory to explain the conglomerate merger wave of the late 
1960s.  Managers get utility from their firms’ growth either because their incomes are tied to 
growth, or because they get “psychic income” from managing a larger firm.14  The constraint 
on managers’ pursuit of growth is the threat of takeover, which is inversely related to q.  
Thus, managers’ utility can be expressed as a function of the growth of their firms, g, and q, 
, where ( ,U U g q= ) 0U g∂ ∂ > , 22 0U g <∂∂ , 0U q∂ ∂ > , and 22 0U q <∂∂ .15
Defining M as the amount of assets acquired through mergers, and setting g = g(M), 
we can maximize ( ),U g q  with respect to M to determine the utility maximizing level of 
growth through mergers.  This yields the following first order condition: 
  (5) ( / )( / ) ( / )( /U g g M U q q M∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ )
Since 0U g∂ ∂ > , , and /g M∂ ∂ > 0 0U q∂ ∂ > , (5) cannot be satisfied if 0q M∂ ∂ > .  For 
any merger that increases q no tradeoff between growth and security from takeovers exists.  
Growth-maximizing managers undertake all mergers that increase q.  Their behavior differs 
from managers who maximize shareholder wealth only with respect to mergers that decrease 
q.  In Figure 2 (A) we depict the relationship in eq. 5 for mergers that lower q.  When no 
mergers of this type are undertaken, q is at its maximum and the risk of takeover is 
minimized.  When the relationship between q and M is such as to yield 
( )( ) 0NU q q M− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ > , a utility-maximizing manager undertakes MN of value destroying 
mergers. 
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To understand the link between the managerial discretion hypothesis (hereafter MDH) 
and merger waves, we must consider the psychology of the market during the stock market 
booms that accompany waves.  As Galbraith (1961, p. 8) observed, an “indispensable 
element of fact” during stock market bubbles is that individuals “build a world of speculative 
make-believe.  This is a world inhabited not by people who have to be persuaded to believe 
but by people who want an excuse to believe.”  These excuses to believe take the form of  
“theories” as to why share prices should rise to unprecedented levels, why the economy has 
entered a “new era” (Shiller, 2000, Ch. 5).  Prominent among these are “theories” about 
wealth increases from mergers.  Shiller gives an example from the stock market boom and 
merger wave at the beginning of the 20th century.  “The most prominent business news in the 
papers in recent years had been about the formation of numerous combinations, trusts, and 
mergers in a wide variety of businesses, stories such as the formation of U.S. Steel out of a 
number of smaller steel companies.  Many stock market forecasters in 1901 saw these 
developments as momentous, and the term community of interest was commonly used to 
describe the new economy dominated by them” (Shiller, 2000, p. 101, italics in original).  
Shiller quotes an editorial from the New York Times from April 1901, which prophesizes that 
the U.S. Steel merger will avoid “much economic waste” and effect “various economies 
coincident to consolidation.”  The editorial also predicts similar benefits from mergers in 
railroads.  Such optimism explains why U.S. Steel’s share price soon soared to $55 from the 
$38 it was floated at in 1901.  By 1903 it had plunged to $9 (Economist, 1991, p. 11). 
Thus, the willingness of investors to accept new news as good news during a stock 
market boom lowers the cost from announcing unprofitable mergers.  Announcements of 
such mergers under normal conditions would result in large declines in the acquirers’ share 
prices preventing their managers from undertaking the mergers.  Announcements of the same 
mergers during a stock market boom lead to only modest falls in share price, or perhaps even 
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increases.  In a stock market boom, the relationship between q and M shifts from its normal 
level, say line N in Figure 2 (B), to something like B.  This change shifts 
( )(U q q M− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ )  to the right, as in Figure 2 (A).  The firm acquires more assets through 
mergers, MB, since q does not drop by as much or perhaps even rises when a merger is 
announced. 
This discussion of stock market psychology during booms sheds a different light on 
the ISH.  To take advantage of the over-optimism in the market, the desire people have to 
believe share prices will rise, managers need to give them an “excuse to believe.”  
Proclamations of synergies accompanying merger announcements may serve as such an 
excuse.  If they do, other firms within an industry may decide to merge naming the same 
synergies, and a “theory” of industry-specific synergies is born.  Twenty-five of the 34 
industry waves that Harford (2004, Table 2) identifies occur during the 1995-2000 period, 
which we identify as the aggregate wave.  One of these is in the insurance industry.  The 
shock precipitating this wave according to Harford is “big is safer, leading to consolidation, 
especially in reinsurers.”  But certainly the advantages of size in insurance were well-known 
long before 1998.  Did these gains really only become apparent in 1998, or did the optimism 
in the market at that time allow insurance companies to use size as a justification for mergers 
that would have met a cooler reception earlier?  The wave in medical equipment had “Two 
motives: first, acquisitions in core areas to grow, then acquisitions outside core areas to offer 
broad products to increasingly consolidated customers (hospitals).”  The first motive seems 
more consistent with the MDH than with a neoclassical theory of mergers, and the second 
resembles the justifications given for diversification mergers ever since the conglomerate 
merger wave of the ‘60s.  Whether these and other reasons given by Harford for the industry 
waves represented real profit opportunities seized by managers, or merely their justifications 
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offered to a gullible market cannot be determined ex ante, which is why we include 
additional evidence like the post-merger returns of acquiring companies.16
For a firm that overinvests, the marginal return on its investment is below its 
neoclassical cost of capital.  Raising funds externally, therefore, will seem more expensive 
than using internal cash flows.  Cash flows have, therefore, been a key variable for 
distinguishing between the MDH and the neoclassical theory in studies of the determinants of 
corporate investment and R&D.17  Cash flows are thus included in our model, as an 
additional way to discriminate the MDH from the other hypotheses.18
B. Critique 
The MDH is neoclassical in assuming maximizing behavior by the key agents – 
managers of acquiring firms.  Predicted changes in behavior are also caused by changes in 
the constraints – the threat of takeover falls during a stock market boom and cash flows 
increase.  The MDH departs from most neoclassical economics, however, by assuming 
managers pursue growth and not shareholder wealth, and that stock market psychology 
influences managers’ decisions.  Although the MDH suffers from no logical inconsistencies, 
many will question its underlying assumptions.  As always the proof is in the pudding, so we 
reserve further discussion of this issue until after we examine our results. 
C. Testing the MDH 
1. Determinants of mergers 
The discussion in subsection A suggests including q to measure the tightness of the 
takeover constraint, and cash flows to measure the funding constraints on managers.  A high 
q frees managers to finance unprofitable mergers by whatever means they choose, but a high 
q should also make them particularly more willing to use their favorite source of finance – 
cash flows.  Thus, we also include an interaction term between q and cash flow with a 
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predicted positive sign.  The higher q is, the more discretion managers have to undertake 
unprofitable investments, and the larger is the predicted coefficient on cash flows.19
Holding M constant, the larger the size of a potential acquirer, the less impact the 
acquisition has on its q.  Thus, the curve relating q to M in Figure 2 should be flatter, the 
larger the size of the acquiring firm (S) relative to the target, M.  Assets acquired through 
mergers should vary positively with firm size. 
To test the MDH, we need a variable to capture the degree of over optimism in the 
stock market.  We have constructed such a variable in the previous section, the mean of the 
individual firm overvaluation measures, Ot.  As this measure is a bit novel, we also 
experiment with a measure implied by Shiller’s (2000) work – the S&P P/E ratio (P/Et).  (We 
could subtract the average P/E to measure over optimism, but subtracting a constant would 
not change the variable’s statistical properties.)  These considerations lead to 
MDH-DM.  
1 1 1 1 1
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
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2. Tender offers versus friendly mergers 
Tender offers are more likely to meet with resistance from target managers and thus 
involve higher transaction costs.  Since acquiring firms’ managers are only interested in 
growth under the MDH, they should not care which firms they acquire, and will thus favor 
friendly mergers because of their likely lower transaction costs.20   
MDH-TO. The MDH-DM receives less support for tender offers, TOit, than for friendly 
mergers, FMit. 
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3. Characteristics of target firms 
All firms are potentially attractive candidates for acquisition by a growth-maximizing 
manager, and thus we formulate no separate hypothesis about the characteristics of targets 
under the MDH.  We have argued, however, that the MDH should be more applicable to 
friendly mergers than to takeovers, and so in our empirical work we shall also test whether 
the characteristics of targets are different for these two sorts of acquisitions.  
4. Share performance of acquiring firms 
Mergers under the MDH are not assumed to be wealth creating.  Since an acquiring 
firm pays a premium for a target’s shares, its shareholders should suffer a wealth loss equal at 
minimum to the gain to the targets.21  On the other hand, the over optimism in the market that 
encourages managers to undertake wealth-destroying mergers should ensure that the 
acquirer’s share price does not drop precipitously when the mergers are announced. 
MDH-SP1.  The shares of acquiring firms earn large negative abnormal returns over long 
time spans following the mergers, but not immediately when they are announced. 
During stock market booms managers have more discretion to make-wealth 
destroying mergers, and the fraction of all mergers that fits the MDH increases leading to 
MDH-SP2. The post-merger performance of acquirers’ shares is worse for mergers 
undertaken during merger waves. 
Thus the MDH makes the same predictions as the OVH with regard to share performance, 
although for different reasons.  As explained above, we expect stronger support for the latter 
two hypotheses for friendly mergers than for tender offers. 
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V. Methodology and Data Description 
Our principal source of data is Global Mergers and Acquisitions database from 
Thompson Financial Securities Data. It contains merger and spin-off data from a variety of 
sources such as Reuters Textline, the Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones etc. The database 
covers all transactions valued at $1 million or more. We define a merger or tender offer as a 
transaction where more than 50 percent of the target’s equity is acquired. A tender offer is a 
formal offer of determined duration to acquire a company's shares made to its equity holders. 
Table 1 presents the total numbers of acquisitions, friendly mergers and tender offers 
in our sample. The popularity of tender offers during the late 1980s is readily apparent with 
their fraction of all acquisitions peaking at 26 percent in 1986.  In reaction to the wave of 
hostile takeovers in the late 1980s, managers approached the legislatures in the states in 
which they were incorporated and demanded legislation that afforded them better protection 
against takeovers.  Most readily complied, which helps explain the sharp relative decline in 
tender offers in the early 1990s (Roe, 1993). 
The various hypotheses lead to predictions regarding the signs on the relevant 
variables, but in most cases do not predict the functional form of the relationship.  We 
experimented with polynomials up to the third order, but report results for the higher order 
terms, only when they are significant. 
Our models might be estimated twice, once as a probit regression to determine the 
probability that a company undertakes an acquisition, and a second time as a Tobit regression 
to take into account differences in the sizes of the targets.  Both probit and Tobit regressions 
were estimated, but only the Tobit results are reported, because they differ from the probit 
results only with respect to the sizes of the coefficients on the different variables.  That is to 
say, the same variables that explain whether or not a firm undertakes a merger in a particular 
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year explain the amount of assets acquired.  The close similarity between the results for the 
probit and Tobit estimations also implies that there was little to be gained from adopting 
Heckman’s (1976) two-stage estimation procedure for censored data. 
Summary statistics for our data are presented in Table 2a.  Mit is the total 
consideration paid by the acquirer i divided by its total assets in year t.22 Tobin’s q is a firm’s 
market value divided by its total assets.  A firm’s market value is the sum of the market value 
of its common stock, the book value of total debt, and preferred stock.  The market value of 
equity is computed by multiplying the number of outstanding shares with the share price at 
year end.  Cash flow is after tax profits before extraordinary items plus depreciation.23 All 
variables are deflated by the CPI (1985=1.00).  The average deal value was $307.2 million 
with targets of tender offers ($474.7 million) being significantly larger than for mergers 
($283.9 million).  This difference might be explained by the fact that tender offers were often 
intended to take over large diversified companies and spin off some of their assets.  Firms 
making tender offers were nearly twice as large on average than acquirers in friendly 
mergers, so that the average target was only 10 percent of the acquirer’s size in a tender offer, 
26 percent in a merger.  Mean Tobin’s q for acquirers in tender offers is not significantly 
different from that of the full sample.  Acquirers in mergers had significantly higher qs than 
other companies, however.  Both types of acquirers have significantly higher levels of cash 
flows than non-acquirers.  Overvaluation as a fraction of total assets amounts to 69.7 percent 
for acquirers in all acquisitions.  Acquirers in friendly mergers are slightly more overvalued 
(71.6%) than acquirers in tender offers (55.3%).  On the other hand, overvaluation of targets 
in all acquisitions is lower than these figures (43.7%).  More importantly, non-merging firms 
have the lowest overvaluation as a fraction of their total assets (37.6%). 
Table 2b presents correlation coefficients of our main variables.  Assets acquired in 
friendly mergers, FMit, are significantly correlated with q, Oit and the P/E ratio.  Assets 
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acquired in tender offers, TOit, have an insignificant correlation with Tobin’s q, and are 
negatively correlated with the P/E ratio and Oit (insignificant).  Tobin’s q is highly correlated 
with our measure of overvaluation.     
 
VI. Tests of the Industry Shocks Hypothesis 
We test the ISH by regressing the assets acquired in year t by firm i, Mit, on 
industry/time dummies, where the time dummies are defined for two-year intervals.  
Although most of the estimates to explain assets acquired presented in this article are made 
using the Tobit procedure, it did not converge for the large number of dummy variables used 
in this test, so we report only the OLS results in Table 3. 
Equation 1 is the benchmark equation and reveals that simply knowing what year it is 
explains two percent of the variation in assets acquired over the 1985-2002 period.  The 12 
time dummies are then replaced with 576 industry/time dummies – the same 12 time 
dummies each multiplied by the 48 industry dummies used by Harford (2004). The addition 
of 564 variables raises the R2 of the equation from 0.020 to 0.032, a statistically significant 
increase, but the 576 industry/time dummies obviously leave much of merger activity 
unaccounted for.  Regardless of the cause of a wave in a particular industry – a technological 
change, deregulation, import competition – if industry waves explain aggregate waves, then 
our procedure for measuring the importance of industry waves should capture their entire 
effect.  We do not need to know why industry j is undergoing a wave in year t, only that it is, 
and that firm i is located in this industry to predict i’s merger activity.  Knowledge of a firm’s 
industry location at a point in time does not explain a large fraction of merger activity, 
however, over and above the knowledge of what year it is. 
 23
Harford adds several firm- and macro-level variables to explain merger activity.  Most 
of these, like firm cash flows, appear in the other hypotheses that we test and, thus, do not 
discriminate among them and are left for discussion later.  One variable that is specific to the 
ISH is the spread between the commercial and industrial loan rate and the federal funds rate, 
C&It.  We have questioned the logic for including this variable in the ISH, but add it to the 
576 dummies anyway.  We lose some 26,000 observations, because C&I is available only as 
of 1986.  It picks up the predicted negative coefficient and is statistically significant.   
Another macroeconomic variable, the aggregate S&P P/E ratio, figures in the MDH, 
and is correlated with C&It (see Table 2b).  Thus the possibility exists that C&It is not 
measuring the tightness of the credit market and thus the cost of financing acquisitions, but 
rather is capturing the effect of the S&P P/E.  When P/Et is included, it has a positive and 
significant coefficient as predicted by the MDH and OVH, and the coefficient on C&It is no 
longer significant (see eq. 4).  Thus, C&It does not effectively test the ISH against the MDH.  
 
VII. Explaining Assets Acquired  
The remaining three hypotheses about the determinants of mergers all take a 
conventional form in that they claim that certain sets of continuous variables explain merger 
activity.  This section tests how well each set explains mergers. 
A. The q-theory 
The q-theory uses a single variable to explain the assets acquired by firm i in t – the 
difference between i’s q in t-1, qi t-1, and the mean q of all targets in t-1, qTt-1.  The 48 industry 
dummies used to test the ISH are also included in the regressions for all acquisitions and 
friendly mergers.  There are far fewer tender offers in the sample than friendly mergers, and 
the Tobit estimation procedure failed to converge for tender offers, when the industry 
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dummies were included.  Thus all results for tender offers are Tobit estimates without 
controlling for industry differences.  Where included, the industry dummies were statistically 
significant as a group.  In the interest of space their coefficients are not reported.  No time 
dummies were included, of course, since the assumption underlying each hypothesis is that 
its particular set of variables accounts for the time-series variation in merger activity. 
In eq. 1 of Table 4, the key variable of the q-theory, qit-1 - qTt-1, has a positive and 
highly significant coefficient as predicted. 
What drives mergers under the q-theory are the potential gains from expanding the 
acquiring firm, as measured by its q, and the relative cheapness of the targets as represented 
by their average q.  Given these two factors, whether a firm chooses to make an acquisition 
through a friendly merger or a tender offer should depend entirely on the relative transaction 
costs of each form of acquisition.  The q-theory should explain both friendly mergers and 
tender offers equally well.  Eqs. 2 and 3 in Table 4 test the q-theory separately for each type 
of acquisition.  The results for friendly mergers again support the q-theory, but for tender 
offers the coefficient on qit-1 - qTt-1 is of the wrong sign, although statistically insignificant. 
These results for tender offers cast doubt on the q-theory. 
Further doubt is cast when qit-1 - qTt-1 is separated into its two components.  The 
coefficient on qTt-1 should be equal in absolute value, but opposite in sign from that on qit-1 – 
the more expensive assets of ongoing companies are, the fewer mergers one sees.  This 
prediction is resoundingly falsified.  The coefficient on qTt-1 is positive and 20 times that of 
qit-1.  Moreover, entering the variables separately greatly increases the model’s explanatory 
power (see eq. 4).  Not only does merger activity not fall as the price of buying other firms 
rises, it increases dramatically.  This result is unsurprising given the figures reported in Table 
1, but nevertheless constitutes a significant empirical refutation of the q-theory of mergers. 
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B. The Overvaluation Hypothesis 
In eq. 5 the coefficient on overvaluation is positive and significant as predicted.  
Under the OVH, the targets’ managers are willing partners in mergers, and thus the OVH 
should receive more support for friendly mergers than for tender offers – and it does.  
Although the coefficient of Oit is positive and significant for both friendly mergers and tender 
offers, it is more than twice as large for friendly mergers implying a much greater sensitivity 
of this form of acquisition to overvaluation than for tender offers (see eqs. 6 and 7).24
Logically under the OVH the source of overvaluation should not matter, only its 
magnitude.  Thus, when Oit is separated into the average overvaluation in the market, Ot, and 
firm i’s deviation from this average, dOit, both variables should have identical coefficients 
(Oit = Ot + dOit).  This prediction is resoundingly falsified.  The coefficient on Ot is some 
seven times larger than the one on dOit. What appears to drive mergers is not that some firms 
have overvalued shares and their managers wish to unload them, but rather that the entire 
market is overvalued.  This market overvaluation can be viewed as measuring the degree of 
optimism in the market, and thus of the market’s willingness to accept the overvalued shares 
of the acquirer.  Although this finding is not totally inconsistent with the OVH,25 it puts a 
considerably different twist on the hypothesis from the one put forward by its original 
proponents, S&V, and makes it more difficult to discriminate the OVH from the MDH.26
C. The Managerial Discretion Hypothesis 
The MDH is expected to do better at explaining friendly mergers than tender offers, 
and so only the separate results for these two forms of acquisitions are reported.  For friendly 
mergers all coefficients have the predicted signs and are highly significant (eq. 9).  Note in 
particular the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term between lagged cash 
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flows and q.  The larger q is, the more discretion managers have to pursue their goals, and the 
more willing they are to use their cash flows to undertake friendly mergers. 
The degree of (over) optimism in the market, the S&P P/E, is highly significant.  So 
too are the three firm size terms.  Their coefficients imply an S-shaped relationship between 
size and acquired assets with the partial derivative changing in magnitude, but remaining 
positive, over the range of asset values.  Size can be interpreted as an additional measure of 
managerial discretion.27
Eq. 10 tests the MDH for tender offers.  As predicted, the fit is poorer than for 
friendly mergers – the pseudo R2 is lower, the coefficient on qit-1 is insignificant, and the 
coefficient on the qit-1/cash flow interaction is of the wrong sign.  We interpret this negative 
coefficient in the following way.  The final transaction in a tender offer is almost always an 
exchange of cash for the target’s shares.  A firm with a high q can raise cash by issuing 
shares, and is more likely to do so, the higher its share price (q).  Firms with low qs are thus 
more dependent on their internal cash flows to finance tender offers, which accounts for the 
negative coefficient on the q/cash flow interaction term.  The importance of cash as the 
means for financing tender offers also explains the large coefficient on cash flows in eq. 10. 
In eq. 11, Ot is substituted for P/Et.  Like P/Et, Ot has a highly significant positive 
coefficient.  The nearly indistinguishable effects of these two measures of market 
overvaluation imply that our results are insensitive to the way we measure overvaluation, and 
underscore the importance of the market’s optimism in explaining friendly merger activity. 
 
VIII. Predicting the Probability of Being Acquired  
Under the OVH targets’ managers want to cash in their stakes and are willing partners 
to mergers that do not generate wealth and saddle their shareholders with overvalued shares.  
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Thus, the likelihood of a firm becoming the target of a friendly merger should be positively 
related to the size of the managers’ stakes, VSit-1, and the extent to which they are overvalued, 
Oit-1.  We also include an interaction term between the two variables under the assumption 
that the greatest incentive to cash in will exist for managers with large financial stakes in 
highly overvalued companies.  The results appear in eq. 1 of Table 5.  None of the variables 
has a statistically significant coefficient.  Other specifications using these variables also did 
not yield significant coefficients.  A plausible implication of the OVH as it applies to the 
targets of mergers is not borne out. 
We have argued that the MDH is more applicable to friendly mergers than tender 
offers.  Tender offers reached their peak during the so-called hostile merger wave of the 
1980s (see Table 1).  The motivation behind many hostile takeovers was to replace the 
target’s managers, who were thought to be doing a bad job running their firms.  This 
explanation for mergers is known as the market-for-corporate-control hypothesis (MCCH).28  
Under the MCCH targets should be underperforming in some sense, while neither the MDH 
nor the OVH necessarily predict that targets are performing poorly.  If a large fraction of 
tender offers are explained by the MCCH and the MDH and OVH are more applicable to 
friendly mergers, we should observe differences in the characteristics of targets for the two 
types of acquisitions.   
We test this prediction by running a probit regression, where the dependent variable is 
defined as one for firm i in t, if it is acquired, zero otherwise.  As explanatory variables we 
use q, size, cash flows and leverage29 (Lit-1).  In the friendly mergers equation, q and size have 
negative and significant coefficients (eq. 2 in table 5).  Targets of tender offers also have 
lower than average qs, but they have higher than average cash flow (eq. 3).  These companies 
are clearly under performing as the MCCH predicts.   
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The size of the target should be an important factor in explaining wealth-creating 
mergers.  If a company wishes to make a tender offer for a company that is larger than itself, 
it should be able to raise the funds from a bank, if the merger will create wealth.  If the tender 
offer succeeds the wealth generated by the merger will suffice to repay the loan.  If it does 
not succeed, the bank need not give out any money.  Similarly, a company should be able to 
issue shares to raise cash for a wealth-creating tender offer of any size, since the wealth-
creating nature of the acquisition, combined with the assumption of capital market efficiency, 
ensures that the value of the company following the merger justifies the price paid for the 
newly issued shares.  Thus, the fact that size’s coefficient is insignificant in the tender offer 
equation and significant for friendly mergers illustrates that the rationales behind friendly 
mergers and tender offers are quite different. 
Under the MDH it is the characteristics and motivation of the managers of the 
acquiring companies that drives mergers.  Accordingly we expect and find that the variables 
predicted under the MDH are better at explaining friendly mergers than tender offers (see 
again Table 4).  Under the MCCH, mergers are explained by the characteristics of the targets 
of mergers.  Accordingly the variables predicted under the MCCH are better at explaining 
which firms become targets of tender offers than of friendly mergers (Table 5). 
 
IX. Post-Merger Returns of Acquiring Companies 
The two neoclassical theories make identical predictions regarding the returns for 
acquiring companies’ shareholders in both friendly mergers and tender offers – positive 
abnormal returns when the mergers are announced, and normal returns for longer windows 
after the mergers.  Since all mergers are assumed to be wealth creating, both predictions 
should be supported for acquisitions made during merger waves and at other times. 
 29
The predictions of the two behavioral theories are quite different.  Acquirers’ returns 
should be nonnegative at the mergers’ announcements and negative for longer windows 
following the mergers.  The returns from friendly mergers should be worse than from tender 
offers, and worse for mergers made during waves. 
To test these predictions returns to acquirers are computed for windows of one month, 
and one, two and three years.  Separate estimates are made for mergers during the great 
merger wave (1995-2000), and outside of it (1980-94 and 2001-2002).  Our measure for 
abnormal return for an acquiring company (A) over a t+n month window is  
 A At n t n t nAR R R
NA
+ += − +  (6) 
where At nR + is the return of A over the n month window (n=1 for one month, n=12, 24, and 36 
for one, two and three year windows, respectively) and NAt nR +  is the mean return on a portfolio 
of non-acquiring (NA) companies, which are in the same size decile as the acquiring 
company.  The returns are calculated using the changes in the total return index from 
Datastream, which is adjusted for dividend payments and share splits. 
The first set of estimates in Table 6 is for the announcement month.  The mean 
returns for acquirers in friendly mergers are insignificantly different from zero.  This finding 
contradicts the two neoclassical theories, but is consistent with the behavioral theories.30  
Also consistent with the behavioral theories, are the higher returns to acquirers in tender 
offers than for friendly mergers, although only the mean returns for tender offers during the 
wave are significantly greater than zero. 
The picture changes dramatically one year after the acquisitions.  Shares of acquirers 
in friendly mergers have significant, negative abnormal returns, and mergers during the wave 
produce worse performance than non-wave mergers.  These results are again inconsistent 
with the neoclassical theories, but exactly what the behavioral theories predict.  Also 
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consistent with the behavioral theories is the post-merger performance after one year of 
acquirers making tender offers during non-wave years.  These are much larger than for 
friendly mergers and insignificantly different from zero.  Many of these tender offers 
occurred during the so-called “hostile merger wave” of the 1980s and were targeted against 
poorly performing companies.  As discussed above, the motivation behind these tender offers 
is likely to have been quite different from that behind friendly mergers.  Tender offers made 
during the merger wave look quite different, however.  Their post-merger share performance 
after one year is the worst of the four categories.  The share performance of tender offers 
made during the wave matches the predictions of the behavioral theories.  Indeed, the 
positive 2.23 percent returns made by these firms in the announcement month coupled with 
the -10.88 percent returns recorded after one year implies a good deal of optimism by the 
market regarding tender offers during waves – optimism that within a year had vanished. 
The post-merger returns after two and three years further substantiate the inferences 
from the one-year results.  Abnormal returns for friendly mergers decline with each passing 
year, with friendly mergers during the wave faring significantly worse than those outside the 
wave.  After three years the mean abnormal return for an acquirer in a friendly merger during 
the wave was -31 percent.  In half of these mergers it exceeded -42 percent.  Shareholders of 
firms making tender offers during the wave suffered the largest post-merger losses, however, 
while tender offers in non-wave years produced the smallest losses.  These results offer no 
support for the neoclassical theories’ claim that mergers create wealth, while strongly 
confirming the predictions of the two behavioral hypotheses.31  
The results in Table 6 support the two behavioral hypotheses, but do not readily allow 
one to discriminate between them.  We thus close this section by testing a key prediction of 
the OVH, namely that the shareholders of acquirers with overvalued shares benefit from the 
mergers, because the shares are traded for real assets.  We do this by regressing acquirers’ 3-
 31
year post-merger returns on the overvaluation variables used in the test of the OVH.32  If the 
mergers benefited the acquirers’ shareholders, they should earn higher returns over the post-
merger period than shareholders of overvalued firms that did not undertake an acquisition.  
Since we identify the time of a merger by the month in which it is announced, our 3-year 
returns for mergers in, say March of 1995, are for the next 36 months.  The sample of non-
merging firms for that month consists of all companies that did not make an acquisition in the 
12 months prior to March 1995, and in the following 36 months.  We estimate separate 
regressions for the whole sample period (1981-2001) and both the wave and non-wave 
periods and include the log of assets as a control variable.  Since the two behavioral 
hypotheses are more plausible for friendly mergers, we report only the results for these. 
Under the efficient capital market assumption, none of the three variables in an 
equation to explain 3-year returns should have a significant coefficient and the equation’s R2 
should be zero.  The R2s in Table 7 are indeed low, but nine of the twelve coefficients on the 
overvaluation variables are significant at the one percent level as is one coefficient on size.  
Eqs. 1 and 2 imply that a company of average size that was not overvalued and did not make 
an acquisition had predicted 3-year return of 76 percent during the non-wave years, and 80 
percent during the wave (see second last column, calculated by adding the intercept to the 
coefficient on size multiplied by its mean).  The same calculations for acquiring firms yield 
predicted returns of -17 and 37 percent.  Thus, if there had been no overvaluation of any kind, 
the 3-year returns of acquirers would have been much worse than that of non-acquirers.   
All twelve coefficients on the overvaluation variables are negative as one expects, if 
the capital market is not efficient and the variables actually do measure overvaluation.  
Moreover, the coefficients on the market’s overvaluation, Ot-1, are much larger for both 
acquirers and non-acquirers during the wave years, as one expects if market overvaluation is 
driving the wave.  The last column in Table 7 presents the predicted returns for a firm, when 
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all three variables are evaluated at their means.  Since the market overvaluation variable has 
the largest negative coefficients and the means of this variable are all positive, the 3-year 
returns calculated at the variables’ means are much lower than for a firm with no 
overvaluation.  After three years the market appears to have corrected some or all of its 
overvaluation for both acquiring and non-acquiring companies. 
The OVH claims to explain merger waves, and that overvalued acquirers do better as 
a result of the mergers than they would have done in their absence.  This prediction is not 
confirmed by the results in Table 7.  During the wave period, the predicted 3-year returns for 
acquirers had there been no overvaluation are 43 percentage points below those for non-
acquirers (second last column).  When evaluated at the overvaluation means, the difference 
increases to 52 percent (last column).  The mergers appear to have done nothing to soften the 
negative effect on returns of being overvalued.  Thus, the results in Table 7 confirm those 
from Table 6 that mergers are bad for the acquirers’ shareholders, and reject the OVH’s 
prediction that mergers mediate the negative effects of overvaluation for acquirers’ 
shareholders. 
 
X. Discussion  
As an explanation of merger waves the q-theory runs as follows.  At certain points in 
time the capital market perceives that many firms are very well-managed and bids up their 
share prices producing high qs and a stock market boom.  High-q firms can profitably expand 
by acquiring other firms, because this is cheaper than acquiring used capital equipment.   
Of the four theories, the q-theory receives the least support.  Logically it suffers from 
the fact that new plant and equipment can always be purchased at a q of 1.0, and the qs of 
targets sore to values greatly in excess of 1.0 during merger waves.  The theory is empirically 
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refuted by the strong positive relationship between the qs of targets and the amounts of assets 
acquired.  Once this implication of the theory is dropped, one is left with the prediction that 
firms with high qs undertake mergers.  Since this prediction is common to both the OVH and 
MDH, it does not effectively discriminate the q-theory from them.   
The ISH explains merger waves by a coincidence of two events: (1) numerous 
industries experience various shocks, which make mergers profitable, and (2) favorable 
macro-conditions reduce the costs of financing acquisitions.  The ISH’s key measure of 
borrowing costs turns out to be correlated with the aggregate S&P P/E, and becomes 
insignificant when this variable is included in an equation to explain assets acquired under 
the ISH.  This empirical finding raises the possibility that the shocks generating simultaneous 
industry waves and thus an aggregate wave are in fact a single “shock” – the rise in market 
optimism reflected by the rise in the P/E, as hypothesized under the MDH. 
Both neoclassical theories assume that managers maximize shareholders’ wealth, 
mergers generate wealth, and thus that acquirers earn positive abnormal returns.  Our results 
fail to confirm this prediction.  Only tender offers during the merger wave produced a 
positive and significant return for acquirers in the announcement month – a modest 2.23 
percent.  These tender offers make up less than five percent of our sample.  Both types of 
acquisitions had significant negative returns to acquirers over longer windows, with the 
acquirers’ share performance worsening with the time the market had to evaluate them.  This 
finding – modest or zero returns to acquirers at merger announcements, substantial negative 
returns over longer periods following announcements – is not new.  Indeed, it constitutes one 
of the great riddles in the literature on mergers – at least for those who assume that managers 
maximize shareholder wealth and equity markets are efficient.33
Both behavioral theories predict these post-merger losses to acquirers, although for 
different reasons.  Under the OVH, the market’s overvaluation, which precipitated the 
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merger, is eventually corrected and the acquirer’s share price falls back to its warranted level.  
Under the MDH, the acquirer’s share price eventually falls, because it paid a premium for the 
target, when there were no synergistic gains to justify it, and perhaps incurred transaction 
costs and perhaps other inefficiencies in integrating the two companies. 
A puzzle under the OVH is why during the stock market boom that accompanies a 
merger wave, managers choose to exchange their overvalued shares for the overvalued shares 
of other firms, and pay a premium to do so, rather than retiring their debt, or buying other 
assets that are not overvalued.  One explanation for this behavior might be that an 
announcement of a swap of equity for debt or the purchase of real estate would signal that a 
firm’s shares are overvalued and lead to an immediate market correction.  If this explanation 
accounts for mergers during stock market booms, then the OVH rests not only on the 
assumption that acquirers’ shares are overvalued, but also that this overvaluation can be 
prolonged only by exchanging these shares for those of other firms.  This interpretation is 
supported by our finding that the explanatory power of a company’s own overvaluation is 
dwarfed by the level of market overvaluation – a measure of overall optimism in the market 
and the willingness of shareholders of targets to accept overvalued shares in exchange for 
their shares.  Since this variable is prominent in the MDH, its empirical weight makes it 
difficult to discriminate between the two behavioral theories.  One test that did discriminate 
between them went against the OVH.  Companies that have overvalued shares do not benefit 
their shareholders by undertaking mergers.  They earn lower returns than similarly 
overvalued firms that do not merge. 
Thus, based on our empirical results we offer the following account of merger waves.  
At some points in time, shareholder optimism begins to rise.  This optimism is fed by various 
“theories” as to why share prices should rise.  Among these are theories as to why mergers in 
certain industries, or by certain firms (e.g., the conglomerates) will generate wealth.  This 
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optimism in the market allows managers to undertake wealth-destroying acquisitions, and not 
have their announcements met by immediate declines in their companies’ share prices.  The 
number of wealth-destroying mergers increases dramatically during a stock market boom 
creating a merger wave.  As the market learns about the mergers, it realizes that they will not 
produce synergies, and that the theories behind them were false.  The market’s optimism 
disappears and the share prices of acquiring firms fall relative to those of other companies.  
Because of the premia paid for the targets and the transaction costs of integrating separate 
companies, the losses to shareholders of companies making acquisitions are greater than one 
expects, simply because the acquiring companies were overvalued. 
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Sources: Mergers: 1895-1920 from Nelson (1959); 1921-67 from FTC; 1968-2002 from M&A. 
P/E ratios: Homepage of Robert Shiller: http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.  Population: Statistical Abstract of United States (several years). 
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Figure 2: The Managerial Trade-off 
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Table 1:  Number of Acquirers and Targets in Friendly Mergers (FM) and Tender Offers (TO) and Mean Tobin’s qs 
 
Acquirers  Targets 
Year          FM TO %TO FM TO  FM FM TO TO
    
          
Market Value / 
Total Assets 
Market Value / 
Total Assets 
 Market Value / 
Total Assets 
Deal Value / 
Total Assets 
Market Value / 
Total Assets 
Deal Value / 
Total Assets 
81 205 14 6.39% 1.275 0.664  1.011 0.756 1.066 0.787
82          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
         
         
        
          
        
          
311 23 6.89% 1.216 0.906  0.846 0.829 0.758 0.711
83 486 23 4.52% 1.377 0.781  1.052 1.018 0.797 0.804
84 478 29 5.72% 1.411 0.921  1.218 1.097 1.073 0.897
85 166 41 19.81% 1.154 0.902  1.085 1.465 1.075 1.754
86 156 56 26.42% 1.245 1.001  1.234 1.654 1.232 1.815
87 177 47 20.98% 1.380 1.118  1.204 1.564 1.140 1.662
88 181 60 24.90% 1.298 1.316  1.384 2.048 1.046 1.757
89 273 55 16.77% 1.327 0.998  1.306 1.588 1.266 2.008
90 318 26 7.56% 1.532 1.356  1.341 1.435 1.253 1.694
91 346 19 5.21% 1.459 1.282  1.397 1.857 1.274 2.144
92 513 16 3.02% 1.873 2.034  1.343 2.123 1.133 1.720
93 607 25 3.96% 1.681 1.557  1.384 2.096 1.706 2.548
94 726 33 4.35% 1.644 1.732  1.238 2.060 1.259 2.556
95 817 57 6.52% 1.623 1.570  1.147 2.292 1.503 2.951
96 960 55 5.42% 1.803 1.581  1.490 2.819 1.200 2.525
97 1001 73 6.80% 1.902 1.652  1.213 2.295 1.057 2.340
98 599 72 10.73% 2.004 1.732  1.590 3.095 1.274 2.602
99 588 63 9.68% 2.218 1.860  1.687 3.109 1.498 2.216
100 550 63 10.28% 2.708 1.646  2.012 2.340 1.886 2.076
101 453 47 9.40% 1.962 2.416  1.490 2.281 1.091 1.865
102 339 37
 
9.84% 1.705 2.006  0.862
 
1.000 1.017 1.468
Total 10250
 
934
 
8.35% 1.742 1.489  1.298
 
1.976 1.118 1.854
Wave 4515
 
383
 
7.82% 1.988 1.683  1.433
 
2.611 1.358 2.471
Non-wave 5735 551 8.77% 1.548 1.347  1.216 1.589 1.117 1.618
Note: The market value of the firm is equal to the sum of market value of equity and the book value of debt.  Deal value is the total amount paid for target in year t. 
Table 2a: Summary statistics, mean values 
 
 
All 
Acquisitions 
Tender 
Offers 
Friendly 
Mergers 
    
Acquirer characteristics:    
Tobin's q 1.71 1.48 1.74 
Overvaluation (% of Total assets) 69.7 55.3 71.6 
Cash flow/Total assets 0.064 0.094 0.060 
Total assets (Mn 1985 USD) 4828.1 8296.6 4461.0 
    
Target characteristics:    
Tobin's q 1.28 1.18 1.33 
Overvaluation (% of Total assets) 43.7 34.6 48.6 
Cash flow/Total assets 0.037 0.079 0.021 
Deal Value (Mn 1985 USD)* 307.32 474.76 283.91 
    
Mit 0.121 0.168 0.116 
    
 Non-merging firms: 
Tobin's q 1.50 
Overvaluation (% of Total assets) 37.6 
Cash flow/Total assets 0.014 
Total assets  (Mn 1985 USD) 503.6 
Note: Tobin's q is the market value of the firm divided by book value of assets; Overvaluation is  from 
equation (4); M
itO
it is the total amount paid for the target divided by total assets.  For this variable, we 
report only firm years with deals. 
 
 
Table 2b: Correlation Coefficients 
 
 Mit qit CFit-1 Oit Kit-1 P/Et C&It
 FM TO FM TO FM TO FM TO FM TO FM TO FM TO 
Mit 1.00 1.000             
               
qit 0.247 0.054 1.000 1.000           
 0.000 0.138             
               
CFit-1 -0.081 -0.101 -0.029 0.124 1.000 1.000         
 0.000 0.005 0.013 0.001           
               
Oit 0.244 -0.037 0.661 0.597 0.138 0.168 1.000 1.000       
 0.000 0.345 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000         
               
Kit-1 -0.081 -0.142 -0.104 -0.071 -0.015 -0.081 -0.074 -0.027 1.000 1.000     
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.197 0.025 0.000 0.484       
               
P/Et 0.124 -0.108 0.189 0.258 -0.064 0.054 0.187 0.284 0.090 0.104 1.000 1.000   
 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004     
               
C&It -0.048 -0.121 0.031 0.106 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 0.065 0.047 0.059 0.100 0.240 1.000 1.000 
 0.000 0.002 0.016 0.007 0.606 0.846 0.675 0.113 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.000   
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Table 3:  Tests of the Industry Shocks Hypothesis 
 
Equation Dummy variables C&It P/Et n 2R  
1 12 2-year time dummies   89946 0.020 
2 576 2-year time / industry dummies   89946 0.032 
3 576 2-year time / industry dummies -0.011 (3.39)  63206 0.028 
4 576 2-year time / industry dummies -0.0049 (1.38) 
0.0009 
(5.68) 63206 0.035 
Notes: t-statistics are below coefficients. 
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Table 4     Explaining the Amounts of Assets Acquired 
 
Eq. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Hyp QH QH QH QH OVH OVH OVH OVH MDH MDH MDH 
Type ALL FM TO ALL ALL FM TO FM FM TO FM 
Industry 
dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
qit-1-qTt-1 0.023 0.025 -0.004         
 15.17 16.37 0.84         
qit-1    0.022     0.027 0.0058 0.032 
    14.62     16.69 1.13 19.37 
qTt-1    0.440        
    25.06        
Oit     0.072 0.078 0.031     
     22.8 23.56 3.66     
dOit        0.062    
        18.82    
Ot        0.42   0.48 
        29.79   36.07 
P/Et         0.012 0.012  
         40.53 14.62  
CFit-1         0.21 1.05 0.19 
         7.89 9.21 7.15 
qit CF,it-1         0.022 -0.078 0.027 
         3.70 3.81 4.64 
Kt-1         9.3*10-6 2.0*10-5 1.0*10-5
         17.83 14.60 19.07 
Kt-12         -5.5*10-11 -1.2*10-10 -5-9*10-11
         13.39 10.62 14.14 
Kt-13         7.1*10-17 1.6*10-16 7.5*10-17
         11.22 9.52 11.87 
            
N 86697 85887 79432 86647 50897 50238 45974 50238 89182 82724 89182 
R2 0.036 0.043 0.0001 0.058 0.06 0.073 0.002 0.11 0.137 0.102 0.122 
Consistent 
 with 
Hypothesis 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Dependent variable is Mit. See the text for the definition of the independent variables. t-statistics are below 
coefficients. 
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 Table 5:   Explaining the Identities of Targets (Probit Estimates) 
 
Eq. 1 2 3 
Hypothesis OVH MDH MCCH 
Type of Acquisition FM FM TO 
Oit
0.005 
(1.48)   
VSit
-2.6*10-6
(0.43)   
VSit * Oit
1.2*10-6
(0.70)   
qit-1  
-0.0013 
(3.46) 
-0.0021 
(5.88) 
CFit  
-0.0006 
(2.25) 
0.0042 
(4.54) 
Kit-1  
-2.5*10-7
(2.87) 
-6.9*10-8
(0.90) 
Lit-1  
0.0021 
(0.82) 
-0.0017 
(1.00) 
N 29642 85475 84209 
Pseudo 2R  0.008 0.012 0.026 
Consistent with 
Hypothesis No Yes Yes 
 
Note: Dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is a one for a firm if it is acquired in a friendly merger, 
zero otherwise.  The dependent variable in column 3 is one if it is acquired in a tender offer, zero 
otherwise. VSit is the product of the market value of a firm’s equity times the fraction of the firm’s 
outstanding stock held by insiders.  The ownership data come from the Compact Disclosure 
database which is based on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s corporate proxy statement. t-
statistics are below coefficients. 
 
Table 6:  The Returns to Acquiring Firms 
 
Friendly Mergers Tender Offers All Acquisitions 
Window Period of Acquisition 
N         
    
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Month of Acquisition Non-Wave 1624 0.021 (0.09) -0.32 180
0.92 
(1.39) -0.00 1804
0.11 
(0.21) -0.29 
      
      
      
      
  
      
      
  
      
      
  
Wave 1396 0.37 (1.42) 0.00 165
2.23 
(2.56) 1.01 1561
0.56 
(0.25) 0.13 
Difference  -0.35 (1.00) -0.32
-1.31 
(1.09) -1.01
-0.45 
(0.33) -0.42 
One Year after 
Acquisition Non-Wave 1645
-5.21 
(5.85) -8.43 184
-2.78 
(2.61) -6.09 1829
-4.97 
(0.84) -8.31 
Wave 1524 -7.95 (7.36) -10.83 171
-10.88 
(3.05) -12.43 1695
-8.24 
(1.02) -10.97 
Difference  2.73
b 
(1.95) 2.40
a  8.09
b 
(4.00) 6.34
b  3.27
b 
(1.32) 2.66
a
Two Years after 
Acquisition Non-Wave 1636
-15.37 
(10.18) -22.17 183
-2.63 
(4.73) -13.98 1819
-14.09 
(1.44) -21.18 
Wave 1513 -20.75 (12.35) -27.11 169
-31.19 
(4.42) -37.36 1682
-21.80 
(1.58) -28.35 
Difference  5.37
b 
(2.39) 4.94
a  28.55
a 
(6.50) 23.38
a  7.70
a 
(2.13) 7.17
a
Three Years after 
Acquisition Non-Wave 1625
-23.38 
(11.24) -34.63 183
-12.09 
(6.37) -23.82 1808
-22.23 
(1.98) -33.47 
Wave 1480 -31.20 (13.93) -42.62 167
-45.85 
(6.14) -58.55 1647
-32.68 
(2.11) -44.58 
Difference  7.81
a 
(2.55) 7.99
a  33.75
a 
(8.89) 34.73
a  10.45
a 
(2.89) 11.11
a
Note: The wave period includes six years from 1995 to 2000. a and b indicate significant differences at 1% and 5% level, respectively. The median test is the Wilcoxon 
Ranksum test. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 7:  Overvaluation and Returns to Acquiring and Non-merging Firms 
 
Equation Period Sample Intercept Ot-1 dOit-1 Size N 2R  
Predicted Return 
at Mean Size and 
Ot-1= dOit-1=0 
Predicted 
Return at 
Means 
           
0.845     
      
          
     
  
      
          
     
  
      
          
      
      
          
      
  
      
          
     
  
      
-0.746 -0.035 0.000 10015 0.014 0.846 0.5361 Whole Period Non-merging 
(18.63) (11.44) (4.02) (0.04)
 
0.806 -0.421 -0.056 -0.009 8258 0.006 0.761 0.608
2 Non-Wave Non-merging
(15.83 (5.25) (5.07) (1.25)
 
0.598 -0.942 -0.005 0.040 1757 0.012 0.799 0.240
3 Wave Non-merging
(3.80) (3.99) (0.37) (3.02)
 
-0.005 -0.333 -0.060 -0.015 2029 0.010 -0.104 -0.274
4 Whole Period Friendly Mergers 
(0.07) (2.91) (3.49) (1.52)
 
-0.076 -0.158 -0.098 -0.015 1114 0.011 -0.173 -0.238
5 Non-Wave Friendly Mergers
(0.68) (1.02) (3.76) (1.15)
 
0.503 -1.098 -0.015 -0.019 915 0.012 0.373 -0.282
6 Wave Friendly Mergers
(2.35) (3.41) (0.59) (1.21)
Notes: The dependent variable is the return over a 36-month window. Ot-1 is the annual mean of the market wide overvaluation.  dOit-1 is the deviation of 
firm i’s overvaluation from Ot-1.  Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. The wave period includes six years from 1995 to 2000. t-
statistics are under the coefficients. 
 
 
Notes: 
                                                          
1 The number of mergers is divided by population to control for the changing size of the economy.  Although 
there has been some controversy over whether what look like waves in mergers are in fact waves, work by 
Golbe and White (1993) and Linn and Zhu (1997) for the United States, and Resende (1999) for the United 
Kingdom appears to have established rather firmly that mergers have come in waves. 
2 Ralph Nelson (1959, 1966) was the first to document the link between merger activity and share prices, and 
numerous subsequent studies have confirmed this finding. See, for example, Melicher, Ledolter and D’Antonio 
(1983), Geroski (1984) for the US, and Geroski (1984) and Clarke and Ioannidis (1996) for the UK. 
3  For surveys of this literature, see Steiner (1975), Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 153-173), Mueller (2003, ch. 8), 
Weston, Chung and Hoag (1990). 
4 For a list of these 48 industries, see the appendix in Fama and French (1997). 
5 See Andrade and Stafford (1999), and Erard and Schaller (2002). 
6 These conceptual differences in applying the q-theory to mergers help explain why Andrade and Stafford 
(1999) find the cross-sectional patterns of investments in capital equipment and mergers to be quite dissimilar. 
Erard and Schaller (2002), on the other hand, claim that they are similar forms of investment. 
7 See, for example, Chappell and Cheng (1984), Andrade and Stafford (1999), and Jovanovic and Rousseau 
(2002). 
8  Since the ratio of the market value of a firm to the book value of its assets is used in several studies testing 
hypotheses about the determinants of mergers, we also use it here, and define and test the q-theory using this 
ratio.  Past research reveals a high correlation between the two variables (Perfect and Wiles, 1994). 
9 We report averages for market value/total assets and deal value/total assets ratios for which we have data. Thus 
the number of firms in each column for any given year is not identical, although the overlap is substantial.  
10 Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003, hereafter RKV) have presented a somewhat different version of the 
OH.  Since S&V were the first to formulate the theory, we concentrate on their version but come back to discuss 
RKV’s version along with the empirical results. 
11 We estimate αs for the years 1981-1994 when the S&P P/E was near its long run average of 15.  The 48 
estimates of α were quite reasonable ranging between 3.36 and 17.45 with a mean of 9.40. 
12Schwert (2000) considers unnegotiated tender offers as a measure of the hostility of US deals.  He also argues 
that bidders are more likely to be perceived as hostile when they use tender offers rather than merger proposals. 
13 Our measure for insider ownership is defined as the total number of shares held in aggregate by all officers 
and directors divided by the number of shares outstanding provided by the Compact Disclosure (CD) database. 
The sole source of ownership data used by CD is the Securities and Exchange Commission’s corporate proxy 
statement. 
14 For recent evidence linking managerial income to growth through mergers, see Khorana and Zenner (1998). 
15 A further justification for including q in the managers’ utility function would be that managers own shares in 
the firm. 
16 There are many “shocks” leading to industry merger waves in the past that are very difficult to reconcile with 
the neoclassical theory.  During the ‘60s merger wave, for example, the tobacco industry went through a wave 
of diversification mergers.  The shock leading to this wave was a report of the US Surgeon General linking 
smoking to cancer and other diseases.  Anticipated internal growth in the industry fell, and managers of the 
tobacco companies chose to substitute external for internal growth.  Why a demonstration of the ill effects of 
smoking would create synergies between cigarette firms and razor, soft drinks and dog food companies is 
unclear.  In the ‘70s a wave of diversification mergers took place in the petroleum industry.  The shock causing 
these was the OPEC oil price increases, which generated billions of dollars of profits for the major oil firms.  
Again the link between oil price increases and synergies from diversification is not readily apparent, nor was it 
apparent to the capital market.  In the ‘80s many oil companies had market values substantially below the 
known value of their oil reserves, and the oil companies became popular targets of corporate raiders.  Fortune 
featured several of the petroleum company mergers in its list of the “worst mergers of the decade” (Fisher, 
1984). 
17 See, Grabowski and Mueller (1972), Vogt (1994), Hay and Liu (1998), and Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu 
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(2004). 
18 To our knowledge Schwartz (1984) is the only study testing the MDH for mergers.  He does not link his 
results to merger waves, however. 
19 See Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2004).  
20 Several studies report higher premia for tender offers.  The summary table of Jensen and Ruback (1985) 
shows that targets in successful tender offers enjoy a 30 percent positive return compared to 20 percent premium 
to targets in successful mergers.  Schwert (1996) reports a premium of 20.1 percent for targets in tender offers 
and 4.9 percent for targets in mergers for a sample of 1814 mergers or tender offers from 1975 to 1991. 
21  For evidence establishing an inverse relationship between the gains to target and the gains to bidders, see 
Mueller and Sirower (2003). 
22 This amount excludes any fees and expenses.  If a company undertakes more than one acquisition in a year, 
we use the total amount spent in all of these transactions. 
23 We obtain balance sheet, income statement and market value data from Compustat.  A complete list of 
variable definitions along with Compustat item numbers is available form the authors upon request. 
24 Dong et al. (2002) and RKRV also obtain quite different results for friendly mergers and tender offers in their 
tests of the OVH. 
25 RKRV’s version of the OVH emphasizes the willingness of the market to accept the overvalued shares of the 
acquirers. 
26 Empirical support for the OVH has been presented in recent papers by Dong et al. (2002), Ang and Cheng 
(2003), and RKRV.  The tests of Dong et al. focus mainly on the choice of payment in mergers, and the pattern 
of post merger returns.  Both Ang and Cheng and RKRV find a positive relationship between the likelihood that 
a firm becomes an acquirer and measures of overvaluation.  Both studies include time dummies in their logit 
equations, however, which conceal the importance of the average overvaluation of the market in explaining 
merger activity. 
27 Ang and Cheng (2003, Table 3) include size in their logit regression to predict the identities of acquirers, 
although they offer a different justification for it.  It is by far the most significant variable in the equation.  
28 Although Marris (1963, 1964) was arguably the first to formulate the hypothesis, the expression “market-for-
corporate-control” was coined by Manne (1965).  Jensen and Ruback (1983) survey several studies, which claim 
to support the hypothesis. 
29 Leverage is the ratio of total debt (short-term and long-term) to total assets. 
30 Ang and Cheng (2003) also present evidence that the acquirers’ shareholders do not suffer immediate losses 
when the mergers are announced. 
31 Dong et al. (2002) and Ang and Cheng (2003) both present evidence of lower post-merger returns for 
acquirers, which fit the OVH.  Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) also find that returns for mergers during 
the wave of the 1990s were significantly lower than for mergers before the wave, although there results differ 
from ours in that the losses occurred immediately upon the announcements.   
32 We also conducted the tests for one- and two-year returns and obtained similar results.  These are not reported 
in the interests of space. 
33 For surveys discussing this evidence and trying to solve the riddle, see Mueller (1977, 2003), Jensen and 
Ruback (1983), Caves (1989), Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 167-174), and Agrawal and Jaffee (2000). 
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